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Abstract
Under U.S. law, marketing databases exist under almost
no legal restrictions concerning accuracy, access, or con-
fidentiality. We explore the possible (mis)use of these
databases in a criminal context by conducting two exper-
iments. First, we show how this data can be used for “cy-
bercasing” by using this data to resolve the physical ad-
dresses of individuals who are likely to be on vacation.
Second, we evaluate the utility of a “bride to be” mail-
ing list augmented with data obtained by searching both
Facebook and a bridal registry aggregator. We conclude
that marketing data is not necessarily harmless and can
represent a fruitful target for criminal misuse.
1 Introduction
In the United States, numerous laws have been enacted
to protect very specific classes of information about indi-
viduals: the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) protects
information used to determine credit worthiness [11];
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) protects medical records [8]; the Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects education
records [10]. However, the U.S. lacks comprehensive pri-
vacy protections. In particular, databases used for market-
ing purposes lack accountability or oversight.
Numerous marketing databases and marketing data
brokers provide information with little or no restrictions,
and sometimes even on a free-trial basis. The database
records often contain names, addresses, email addresses,
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interests, and numerous other pieces of information about
an individual. These databases are often created by the
bulk purchasing of commercial transaction records and/or
aggregating public records [3]. Considered in the abstract
and by themselves, most individuals are unlikely to have
expectations of privacy about these data sources. How-
ever, the aggregation and cross-referencing of this data
from multiple sources is likely to raise privacy concerns.
The piecemeal privacy regulations in the U.S. currently
do not cover data used for this purpose. Indeed, from a
business standpoint, the biggest constraint on this data is
that it must not be used for purposes that would bring it
under the FCRA (or other regulations). That is, the bro-
kers purposefully avoid regulations that might bring ac-
countability. At the same time, these brokers are aware
of how unsettling their practices are to consumers: while
purchasing this type of data, we observed that some data
brokers insist on source confidentiality. That is, if a con-
sumer inquires, the recipient must not disclose the identity
of the data broker from which the data was purchased.
Despite these databases being beyond the reach of pri-
vacy regulations in the U.S., such as the FCRA, and do-
ing their best to remain as such, the information they col-
lect is potentially dangerous. We investigate some pos-
sible criminal uses of these marketing databases, espe-
cially when combined with information obtained from
web searches. We studied two possible attacks. First,
we utilize email to address mappings in conjunction with
YouTube searches. Next, we purchased a list of “brides
to be” from a data broker and correlated this informa-
tion with publicly available data on Facebook. Both ex-
periments reproduce previous “cybercasing” [6, 5] exper-
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iments, which examined how geotags could be abused.
Unlike geotagging, however, a person has effectively no
control over the release of data by marketing data bro-
kers. We hope our study will encourage regulators to look
at regulating such marketing databases more closely.
2 Prior Work
Friedland and Sommer previously performed several
studies to examine how publicly available data could be
misused [6]. Their studies focused on high-accuracy lo-
cation information attached as meta-data to audio, image,
and video files. Specifically, they examined how geotags
could be used for “cybercasing,” using online data and
services to mount real-world attacks.
The first scenario involved tracking a specific person,
in this case TV show host Adam Savage who is an active
Twitter user. It turned out that most images posted to his
feed contained an exact geolocation attached by his smart-
phone, allowing them to locate his studio, places where he
walks his dog, his home, and also where he met with other
celebrities while on travel.
In the second scenario, the authors inspected a ran-
dom sample of Craigslist postings containing geotagged
images. They examined all postings to the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area’s For Sale section over a period of four
days, in total collecting 68,729 images, of which about
1.3% of the images were tagged with GPS coordinates.
A fair amount of the geotagged postings offered high-
valued goods, such as diamonds apparently photographed
at home, making them potential targets for burglars. In
addition, many posters even offered specifics about when
and how they wanted to be contacted (“please call Sunday
after 3pm”), which allowed for speculation about when
that person might or might not be at home.
In a third scenario, the authors examined whether one
can semi-automatically identify the home addresses of
people who normally live in a certain area but are cur-
rently on vacation. Such knowledge offers opportunities
for burglars to break into their unoccupied houses. They
wrote a script using the YouTube API that, given a home
location, a radius, and a keyword, finds a set of match-
ing videos shot within this radius and containing the key-
word. For all the videos found, the script then gathers
the associated YouTube user names and downloads all of
their videos that are a certain vacation distance away but
have been uploaded within the last couple of days. The
home location was set to be in downtown Berkeley, CA,
and the radius to 100 km. The authors searched for the
keyword “kids” since many people publish home videos
of their children. The vacation distance was 1000 miles.
Even though only about 3% of the YouTube content was
geotagged at the time, the script reported 1000 hits (the
maximum number the site returns for any query) for the
initial set of matching videos. These then expanded to
about 50,000 total videos in the second step identifying all
other videos from the corresponding users. 106 of these
turned out to have been taken more than 1000 miles away
and uploaded the same week. Sifting quickly through the
titles of these videos, the authors easily found that about
a dozen looked promising for a successful burglary.
Friedland and Choi built on this work by removing the
need for geotags using an automatic location estimation
system [4]. Their approach to location estimation was a
machine-learning and semantic-web driven method based
on the open service GeoNames.org. GeoNames covers
all countries and contains 8 million entries of place names
and corresponding geo-coordinates. It provides a web-
based search engine and an API which returns a list of
matching entries ordered by their relevance to the query.
They showed how geotags are unnecessary for cybercas-
ing by searching for videos that contained keywords of
known cities, and then correlating any names found in the
videos with phone book data.
Friedland et al. examined these methods more gener-
ally by showing how multiple data sources could be ag-
gregated to make better inferences [5]. In this manner,
they showed how criminals could use multiple public data
sources to increase the likelihood that a potential burglary
target will not be home, improve a stalker’s reach, or even
to frame someone.
While prior work in this area examined combining data
from multiple sources to increase a criminal’s effective-
ness, no one has yet explored how data brokers might fit
into this ecosystem. Unlike prior work, in which more
privacy awareness would have been beneficial for users
(e.g., disable geotagging), there is not much users can do
for the release of consumer data by data brokers [3]. We
posit that the market for consumer data creates a potential
boon for criminals well beyond the control of consumers
and what has previously been discussed in the literature.
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3 The Ecology of Data
The Light Side: Whenever a user interacts with a com-
pany, such as buying a product or filling out a sweepstakes
form, that creates a data footprint. A product order tells
the company the person’s name, shipping address, billing
address, email address, and what they purchased. The
company might then sell this data element to data brokers
without the customer’s knowledge or explicit permission.
These data brokers coalesce, analyze, filter, aggregate,
and resell the resulting data, with each broker attempting
to create a more accurate profile of all individuals in their
data set. While data can sometimes end up corrupted,
especially for those with “common-name@big-provider”
email addresses that others might mistakenly use, it can
often provide accurate information about some individu-
als. Some estimates suggest there are 4000 separate com-
panies involved in this process [12], and many brokers
make the data available to any buyer willing to pay.
Access to a broker’s data usually occurs in one of two
forms, an append interface or provided lists [3]. An ap-
pend interface has the buyer providing a list of records and
the data broker annotates the results with other features if
available, charging for each successful annotation. For
example, the data customer might provide a list of email
addresses, to which the broker will append features such
as demographic information, purchase habits, income es-
timates, home ownership, or other fields. In particular,
some brokers specifically support annotating mailing ad-
dresses, allowing the data customer to associate email ad-
dresses to mailing addresses.
Some companies also offer interactive access for ap-
pending information. Rapleaf provides an API-based in-
terface where a customer can provide either email ad-
dresses or mailing addresses and receive a demographic
profile in a claimed 50ms of processing time [9]. De-
mographic parameters include gender, age range, income
level, home ownership, and various interests such as
sports, travel, pets, outdoor and adventure, and whether
the person tends to donate to charitable causes.
The second form of access is to provide lists about in-
dividuals matching a given criteria, such as “brides to be”
or “rape victims” (in a notorious case, which the provider
subsequently insisted was simply a test, not an actual
list [7]), often with additional constraints such as zip code
or domain specific data, such as wedding date. The data
broker then provides an agreed upon number of matching
entries and the specified fields, such as email address and
mailing address.
The Dark Side: Criminals have discovered the benefits
of aggregating and reselling identifying and financial data
for the purposes of identity theft. Credit report data is
remarkably cheap, with a full target credit report costing a
reported $15 giving the target’s full name, address, date of
birth, and social security number (SSN) [1]. The service
also offers to provide someone’s SSN and date of birth
given their name and address for just $1.50.
There was also a report back in 2007 of criminals using
marketing lists to find elderly scam victims for telemar-
keting fraud [2]. While marketing lists are certainly not a
new technology, we have recently reached a point where
ubiquitous online data can be augmented with these lists
to create unprecedented views into every aspects of an in-
dividual’s life. In an attempt to draw attention to this is-
sue, we performed two experiments using the information
that we purchased from data brokers.
4 Study One: How’s The Trip?
We initially set out to determine whether we could re-
produce our previous cybercasing [6] experiment without
utilizing geotags. In the previous study, we searched for
vacation videos with geotags, and then discovered home
videos from the same account with geotags.
In our new study, we began by searching for videos
based on the vacation topic (list) and extracting the
Google username. After excluding obviously bogus user-
names, we submitted 2824 names to a data broker as an
append request. (We do not name the data broker we used
since our contract with it appears to prohibit disclosing its
identity.) The overall cost was a $500 setup fee plus an
additional $0.10 for each match successfully appended.
The result was surprisingly negative: out of the 2824
addresses submitted, only 9 were successfully appended.
We believe this is due to three factors: a lack of correlation
with purchasing behavior, the list-focused nature of the
data broker we utilized, and the relative quality of this
particular data broker.
First, if a user doesn’t utilize their Google account for
making purchases, there will be no link between the mail-
ing address and email address available to a data broker to
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sell. Google itself may have information about the user’s
address, but Google has no incentive to sell this informa-
tion to others as it represents a competitive advantage.
Second, list-focused data brokers do not prioritize com-
plete coverage as highly as more traditional data brokers,
such as credit reporting agencies. In credit reporting, a
small number of brokers strive for complete coverage. If
a credit agency only had information on 50% of the pop-
ulation, it would not be competitive in the marketplace
since the data consumers select the queried names. A list-
centric data broker’s incentives are different: they don’t
need complete coverage, rather they need quality in the
data they have since the broker gets to select its best data
matching the requested criteria to share with the data con-
sumer. This broker in particular focuses as a reseller of
lists with a wide variety of topics, including religious af-
filiation (Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, etc), economic profile
(credit score), ethnicity, political donation habits, holders
of handgun concealed carry permits, and even such eso-
teric lists as “boat owners in LaGuna Niguel, California.”
Third, we selected this broker mostly due to setup cost.
Most data brokers are only interested in large orders.
Even this broker required a $500 setup cost for the append
query, and this may represent a case of “you get what you
pay for.”
We also did some spot checking on results, and found
that append data may be of marginal quality. For exam-
ple, although it correctly identified one author’s father’s
address and one cousin, the address for another cousin
and the author himself were completely wrong: not even
in the correct state.
5 Study Two: What a Happy Bride
List purchases, however, don’t suffer the same defects:
not only do the providers claim high accuracy (often over
90%, and sometimes as high as 95%), but the nature of
list construction prevents the “null entry” problem faced
when purchasing append data. Thus, we considered the
possibility of lists as targets for theft. Numerous criteria,
ranging from known gun owners to any selection criteria
for high income might have potential.
For our study, we chose “brides to be,” with name,
mailing address, email address, and date of wedding. The
cost of this data was only $0.20 an entry for 5000 entries.
Having the email address allows some additional search-
ing for ancillary data and indicates an online presence, the
mailing address gives the person’s location, and the wed-
ding date itself provides a day when the person’s home
will likely be empty. We explore this ancillary data as a
means of estimating list accuracy.
Our first check was to determine whether we could
find bridal registries for the listed names, as a lower
bound on the correctness. We utilized registry.
weddingchannel.com, a bridal registry aggregator ser-
vice that indexes multiple bridal registries and allows
search by name, with the returned information including
city, state, and date of wedding.
We uses several matching criteria. A strong match,
where full name, city, state, and wedding date matched,
and a weaker match where the full name, city, and state
match but the wedding date does not. One quarter of the
names featured a strong match, with an additional 7.4%
obtaining a weaker match.
Of particular note, however, is that the pair of first name
and last name did not match at all in 41% of the cases.
Given the breadth of the wedding registry aggregator it-
self (16 separate registries), this suggests that either there
are other items feeding into the bridal list (i.e., beyond
companies selling their bridal registries to data brokers)
or that the bridal list has an error rate significantly higher
than that claimed by the data broker.
We also checked if some registries seems overrepre-
sented in the data. The most significant matches were
with Bed Bath & Beyond (942), Target (643), and Macy’s
(406). We could not draw any conclusions about the bro-
ker’s sources given the overall popularity of these stores
and the lack of domination by any one of them.
Facebook is also a rich source of ancillary data. Previ-
ously, Facebook’s Graph API enabled searching by email,
but this interface is now deprecated. Instead, we searched
on a combination of first name, last name, and city, which
is a fuzzier match. First, we retrieved a list of user
matches using Facebook Graph API with queries ’[first
name] [last name] [city name]’ with ’user’ as the search
type. Then for each user in the retrieved list, we parsed
each of the user’s timeline HTML to gather the current
city and state information, since these pieces of informa-
tion are not available when only using the Graph API.
We were able to obtain candidate Facebook accounts for
17.1% of the list entries that had a first name, last name,
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city and state match.
We then manually examined a portion of the Facebook
matches. We examined 129 data-list entries that also had
a strong match on the bridal registry list. Amongst them,
we found 64 (50%) to have clear indications of an upcom-
ing wedding. We also examined 290 data-list entries that
lacked a matching registry entry. We found 107 (37%) to
have such indications.
Of particular note, 50 Facebook pages included pho-
tographs of the bride’s wedding or engagement ring, an
indicator of income level, while 5 pages included infor-
mation about the bride’s honeymoon plans.
6 The Rise of Criminal Brokers?
Criminal brokers already exist for finical data acting as
“append” services, but there is nothing stopping similar
services from developing for the sorts of non-financial
data we examined. Given the lower barriers to access,
it would be straightforward for criminal groups to set up
their own data brokers.
The likeliest target would be criminal lists, akin to the
marketing lists, of high candidate potential victims. For
burglary or similar activity, a subscription service could
provide lists by zip-code of possible candidates with as-
sociated profiles.
The lists themselves don’t need to be too expensive to
be profitable. Since our purchases cost $0.20 a name,
if only 1/50th of the names are salable, the selling cost
of such lists needs to be only $10/name for the criminal
broker to break even. Likewise, the consumer of the list
doesn’t need to obtain much more than $10 of value from
a name for a $10 purchase to be worthwhile.
The best target is probably gun ownership. Within the
criminal black market, guns represent a unique product,
where there isn’t a substantial loss in value when attempt-
ing to fence. Although a gun-ownership list doesn’t pro-
vide a set of times when a target is away, it does provide
a list of homes which contain particularly valuable items.
Obtaining the lists we used was straightforward: a le-
gitimate looking email address (we used our own .edu
address when purchasing data) and a credit card to buy
the data. The biggest obstacle was learning the correct
terms when communicating with the data brokers.
Overall, the biggest limitation is list accuracy. We have
trouble believing the 90% accuracy rate claimed by the
list brokers, but its also clear from the bridal data that this
does achieve an accuracy rate that appears to be roughly
50% accuracy. List inaccuracy increases the overall cost
to the attacker, as any false positive in the list represents
wasted resources when an attacker evaluates the result.
For marketeers, inaccuracy is a minor but tolerable
cost: a false match is a wasted mailer, but the total cost
per mismatch is only a dollar or so. Criminal uses may
have a higher penalty for mismatch: if someone needs to
investigate a target in person, a false match might have a
cost measured in tens or perhaps even hundreds of dollars.
We’ve shown that, to at least some degree, list inaccu-
racy is countered with ancillatory data. For our bridal ex-
ample, we used Facebook or registry services to validate
portions the raw data. The ancillatory data, especially if
it has a single sided error (people seldom post about a
nonexistent wedding on Facebook), is of particular use
since it acts to ensure a sub-list of true positives. Low
cost validation strategies may depend on the context but,
when available, can produce a much cleaner data stream.
One of the most powerful tools that we did not inves-
tigate is Google Maps streetview. The lists already con-
tain the target’s address, which makes a simple matter of
putting the address into Google to instantly gauge any ob-
vious security systems (such as signs), the income level,
and secondary signals such as the bumper stickers of cars
in the driveway (as it is highly unlikely for a truck with an
NRA bumper sticker to be owned by a non-gun owner).
7 Conclusion
We live in a soup of data, producing little eddies of infor-
mation with every action we take. A whole host of data
brokers exist to slurp up this information, process it, and
digest it into a form enjoyed by marketeers and merchants.
Yet this data, although not generally regulated by the
U.S. government, is not without its risk. We showed the
ability to partially replicate the previous cybercasing re-
sult without requiring any geotagged data, an exercise that
will probably grow in precision as marketeers attempt to
map email to physical location on a more regular basis.
We also showed the possibility of creating criminal lists
derived from a public purchased list of brides to be, and
how such lists can be both enhanced and cleaned using an-
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cillatory search data such as Facebook profiles and bridal
registry information. Overall, we believe that marketing
data is not necessarily harmless: there is significant po-
tential for abuse.
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